

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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\*South Vietnam: There are increasing indications that the enemy is using the current lull to prepare for a new round of offensive action.

25X1 Communist preparations for largescale attacks are related to discussions between the 25X1 US and North Vietnam. order to win a position of strength in negotiations, " the enemy is building up his forces for a 'general offensive against the cities and towns." 25X1 the Communists will launch a "second general attack" if talks are "not successful,"

An undated document captured on 5 April specified that all Communist units in the coastal area of II Corps would undergo a period of training through June emphasizing tactics for combat in cities. It cited difficulties in the last three months in obtaining replacements, supplies, and adequate training.

A letter of 9 March recently captured in another province of II Corps says "the planned general attack" has been postponed; only "armed action teams and some military elements" will be used in operations for the time being.

Similarly, two sources in III Corps say that the Communists have stopped sabotage and terrorist activities in order to concentrate on indoctrination involving "the new political situation in this new period." Although main force units in III Corps continue to avoid contact, there has been as yet no discernible decline in enemy harassment or terrorism.

25X1 the Communists expect a period of renewed offensive operations which

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will be geared largely to influencing US-DRV negotiations.

President Thieu is still considering ways to strengthen his government, but apparently has made no firm decisions.

Thieu is impressed by the qualifications of Tran Van Huong for the prime ministership but is uncertain about the timing of any change.

Vice President Ky told
that Huong's appointment was not definite and that he personally considered Huong "too old, stubborn, and opinionated."

Commenting on Huong's generally narrow approach to the subject of peace negotiations, Thieu reportedly stated that most important considerations were an international guarantee—with unqualified US backing—of South Vietnam's territorial integrity, and maintenance of the present level of US aid. He added that with these conditions, the South Vietnamese Government could handle "most of the other problems."

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Korea: Small-scale attacks by North Korean forces and belligerent propaganda from Pyongyang have heightened tension along the Demilitarized Zone.

On 14 April a UN Command truck was ambushed near Panmunjom. A South Korean patrol was pinned down all day on the 17th by fire from a North Korean guard post. On the 19th, Pyongyang radio reported additional armed clashes in the Zone and praised the North Korean Army for its "brilliant feat of arms."

Skirmishes along the Demilitarized Zone are usually touched off when small numbers of North Korean agents attempt to infiltrate South Korea. The latest exchanges suggest, however, that Pyongyang is adopting a more aggressive posture along the Zone. Incidents of greater seriousness may occur.

West Germany: Officials are girding for new student demonstrations this weekend.

A major protest, ostensibly against the Greek military regime, is slated for downtown West Berlin on Sunday. Other demonstrations focusing on Greece, Vietnam or the Springer publishing firm are set for West Germany and West Berlin on 27 April, and 1, 8 and 11 May.

Government leaders are sticking to their firm but moderate stand and are confident that order can be maintained by local police. They may resort to preventive arrests of radical student leaders if serious disorder threatens.

The government's handling of the disorders is expected to be a major issue in the Baden-Wuerttemberg elections on 28 April. Chancellor Kiesinger's Christian Democratic Union, which has stressed maintenance of public order, is the party most likely to profit, provided that further demonstrations do not get out of hand.

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\*East Germany - West Berlin: Student unrest in West Berlin is being influenced to a limited degree by the East German Communist Party.

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dent leader Dutschke received "guidance" and accepted material support from the West Berlin branch of the East German party.

RUDI DUTSCHKE

Dutschke was not, however, under the direct control of the party.

The East Germans have in the past shied away from all-out support for the dissident West Berlin students, who are regarded as too radical by the East Germans. Still, student leaders other than Dutschke have received careful covert help from the Communists in the form of funds and other types of assistance.

The undisguised assistance provided to demonstrators last week by East Germany and the Communist party in West Berlin suggests that future student activity in Berlin may be accompanied by increasing Communist (Photo) involvement.

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Czechoslovakia: Prague has indicated it will seek to trade more in the world market and loosen its economic ties with Communist states.

According to the Prague press, Foreign Trade Minister Vales on 17 April characterized the practical results of CEMA as minimal and stated that he was not optimistic about its future. He confirmed that Czechoslovakia has inquired unofficially about credits from the West, and is preparing for greater participation in the world market. He indicated that the state will maintain its monoply in foreign trade, but that considerations of the world market, rather than those of the Communist area alone, would play a greater role.

Support for Vales' views have come from CEMA Deputy Secretary Karol Martinka, a Czechoslovak, who stated that only a small portion of trade among CEMA countries results from planned specialization and cooperation. Moreover, the Czech staffs of two CEMA bodies have petitioned the party for greater Czechoslovakiparticipation in the "world economy," the policy now endorsed by Vales.

The publicity accorded the criticism of CEMA may be an effort to spell out the position Prague will take at the economic summit agreed to at the Dresden meeting in March. As yet no date has been set for this "summit." The USSR and other CEMA members continue to voice the standard theme that Communist economic relationships should develop within the CEMA framework, although most members have expressed dissatisfaction with the organization.

Sierra Leone: The situation is fluid, but security conditions are improving after the successful army mutiny.

A 14-man "sergeant's junta" is establishing a "National Interim Reconstruction Council," consisting of army and police personnel. The Council apparently is charged with working out the return of a civilian government in "the shortest possible time."

Two former officers have been named to take over the top positions in the army. Colonel Bangura, who joined All People's Congress party leader Siaka Stevens in Guinea last month, will take over command of the army. His deputy will be Lieutenant Colonel Ambrose Genda, who has been in frequent touch with elements opposed to the former junta. Both returned to Freetown yesterday.

The mutineers were motivated principally by desire for personal gain. They were apparently encouraged by adherents of Steven's party and by supporters of the former party of ex-prime minister Margai, both of whom promised sizable pay raises and promotions. These tribally based groups appear to be vying with each other to gain an upper hand with the new junta.

The All People's Congress appears to be in the best position to exploit the current situation. A majority of the junta appear to be northern Temne tribesmen, from whom the party draws its main support. Party leader Stevens probably intends to return to Freetown, perhaps this weekend.

Meanwhile, top army officers and senior police officials have been arrested. All members of the former junta are imprisoned, except for two, whose fate is unknown. Security conditions could rapidly deteriorate if a power struggle develops between the Temne tribesmen from the north and Mende tribesmen from the south.

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## NOTE

\*USSR: Premier Kosygin will interrupt his trip home from Pakistan tomorrow for a brief discussion of the Vietnam war with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi. His surprise detour to New Delhi is probably intended to seek Indian support for Moscow's campaign to pressure the US into prompt negotiations with Hanoi. Kosygin may also reassure Mrs. Gandhi that his visit to Pakistan will not diminish Soviet support for Indiaparticularly if Moscow has decided to go further than in the past in meeting Pakistani requests for military assistance.

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